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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellant, :
v.

:

WAYNE DERRON POTTER,

:

Defendant-Appellee.

Case No. 920614-CA
Priority No. 15

:

OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiff State of Utah appeals a trial court's final
order of dismissal in a prosecution for carrying a concealed
dangerous weapon, a class A misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-10-504(1)(b) (1990), unlawful possession of a
controlled substance (marijuana), a third degree felony in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(b)(iii) and -(2)(d)
(1990), and unlawful possession of a controlled substance
(cocaine), a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-8(2)(b)(ii) and -(2)(d) (1990).

The dismissal order was

entered upon defendant's motion, following the trial court's
grant of his motion to suppress evidence supporting the charges.
The proceedings were held in the Seventh Judicial
District Court, in and for Emery County, Utah, the Honorable Boyd
Bunnell, presiding.

This State's appeal is taken pursuant to

Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(2)(a) (Supp. 1992); this Court has
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992).
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ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
A single issue is presented: Did the trial court
erroneously conclude that defendant's detention by a police
officer was not supported by reasonable suspicion/ and was
therefore constitutionally invalid at its inception?

Trial court

rulings on reasonable suspicion to make an "investigative
detention" are not reversed on appeal unless they are clearly
erroneous.

State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987);

State v. Svkes, 198 Utah Adv. Rep. 35, 36 (main opinion), 43
(Jackson, J., concurring) (Utah App. Oct. 19, 1992).

Accord

State v. Rochell, No. 920309-CA, slip op. at 7-10 (Bench, J.,
concurring) (Utah App. April 1, 1993).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
states:
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1990), provides:
A peace officer may stop any person in a
public place when he has a reasonable
suspicion to believe he has committed or is
in the act of committing or is attempting to
commit a public offense and may demand his
name, address and an explanation of his
actions.

2
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Any other constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules pertinent
to the resolution of the issue on appeal are set forth as
necessary in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant Wayne D. Potter was charged with unlawful
possession of a concealed weapon, and with two counts of unlawful
possession of a controlled substance.

The physical evidence

supporting those charges consists of a pistol, and quantities of
marijuana and cocaine that were seized upon defendant's detention
by a police officer.
Defendant moved to suppress the seized evidence.

At a

hearing on the motion, the detaining officer testified.
Additionally, at the parties' stipulation, the trial court
considered testimony taken in a companion case, State v. Devon
Bovd Potter, involving the entry and search of the trailer home
occupied by defendant's brother, at about the same time that
defendant was stopped (R. 99). The entry and search of Devon
Potter's home are the subject of another appeal now pending in
this Court, No. 920579-CA.
After the hearing, the trial court granted defendant's
motion in a written "Ruling on Motion to Suppress" (R. 78). Upon
the State's motion to reconsider that ruling, the court
reaffirmed itself in a written "Ruling on Motion to Reconsider"
(R. 96). The court then issued written Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, and an Order on Motion to Suppress (R. 99106).

Subsequently, on defendant's motion, the prosecution was
3
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dismissed and the State filed a notice of appeal from the
dismissal (R. 107-114; all rulings are copied in the Appendix to
this brief).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The State's fact recitation tracks the trial court's
findings of fact, (R. 99-102), as supported by testimony taken
during the hearing of defendant's motion to suppress (R. 212-65).
This fact recitation is also supplemented by testimony in the
hearing of Devon Potter's motion to suppress (R. 123-211). *
Seizure of the Evidence
Defendant Wayne Potter's problems began late one
evening, when an officer stopped Mr. Leon Sandstrom for driving
under the influence, near Devon Potter's home.

Quite

spontaneously (and hoping for favorable treatment in his pending
D.U.I, prosecution), the intoxicated Sandstrom pointed to Devon's
home, which he had recently left, and blurted out that several
men were smoking marijuana inside it (R. 100, 127-32).
A narcotics detective was therefore summoned (R. 13334).

To the detective, Sandstrom claimed that the occupants of

Devon's home were rolling marijuana "joints" from "a bag of
marijuana three fingers deep."

Based upon the information from

Sandstrom, plus other information from an already-pending
investigation, the detective and the local county attorney began
a search warrant application for Devon Potter's home (R. 169-70).
2

As in the trial court, the parties have stipulated to the
supplementation of the appellate record with the Devon Potter
hearing transcript (R. 120).
4
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The detective told several officers to watch Devon's
home pending issuance of the search warrant (R. 166-67).

During

this surveillance, officers saw persons within the home peering
out through its window and door several times, apparently alerted
by Sandstrom's nearby arrest (R. 136, 189-90).

One officer saw a

white Nissan drive to Devon's home. A person exited the Nissan,
walked to the home, remained only briefly ("about two or three
minutes"), and then drove away (R. 100, 141, 148, 218, 230).
The officers radioed their observations to the
narcotics detective, who directed them to enter Devon Potter's
home, and to secure it pending arrival of the search warrant.2
He also directed them to detain and secure the departing white
Nissan (R. 155-56).

This latter task was assigned to an

:>ting highway patrolman, Trooper Horrocks (R. 101, 156).
Upon stopping the Nissan, Horrocks immediately
recognized the driver, defer ~ it Wayne Potter.

Horrocks had

known defendant for several years, and knew that he had been
previously arrested for illegal drug possession (R. 219-20).
Horrocks believed defendant to be dangerous, based upon "common
knowledge among the law enforcement community" that defendant
carried a hidden weapon.

Trooper Horrocks also knew one of

defendant's three passengers, a Jimmy Lee, as someone he had
arrested twice before.

Horrocks knew that Lee "has a short

temper and he's very—he was very easy to aggravate into a
2

The propriety of this home entry is at issue in the State's
appeal in the Devon Potter case. State v. Devon Boyd Potter, No.
920579-CA, Br. of Appellant at 10-14.
5
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confrontation,"

Horrocks had previously had a physical

confrontation with Lee (R. 101, 222-23).
Concerned for his safety, Trooper Horrocks asked
defendant and his passengers whether they had any weapons.

He

then directed them to exit the Nissan and to empty their pockets
on its trunk.

Horrocks explained that he used this approach,

rather than individual frisks, in order to better observe all the
detainees at once:

"To frisk them individually, you have to

concentrate on the individual which you're frisking, and you lose
contact or observation of the other individuals there."

. ..

"If you can't see them, you can't protect yourself against
movement that they do, or an attack" (R. 101, 223-25).
Defendant did not fully comply with Horrocks's
directions.

After partially complying, defendant behaved

evasively; according to Horrocks, he "wouldn't make eye contact
with me, and he tried to avoid standing next to me, and he tried
to hide behind Jimmy [Lee]."

Horrocks then told defendant that

"I didn't want him messing around with me, if he had something in
his pockets, I wanted it out on the car."

In response, defendant

removed a pistol from his rear pocket, and placed it on the
Nissan's trunk (R. 101, 225).
Horrocks arrested defendant for unlawful possession of
a concealed weapon.

Positioning defendant between himself and

the Nissan's passengers, Horrocks then searched defendant
incident to the arrest (R. 102, 228-29, 232-33).

From

defendant's pocket, Horrocks retrieved "[a] small plastic bag
6
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containing a green leafy material that appeared to be marijuana .
. .."

He also retrieved a small Tupperware-type container,

placed by defendant on the Nissan's trunk, that held a white
powder residue (R. 102, 226-27).

The pistol, leafy material, and

white powder (apparently cocaine) comprised the physical evidence
supporting the charges against defendant (R. 3-4).
Trial Court Disposition
The trial court determined that "[i]f there was
reasonable cause to believe that illegal activity was going on
inside [Devon Potter's home], there was [sic] no articulable
facts connecting the Defendant with such activity other than his
brief appearance on the premises" (R. 102). Therefore, the court
ruled that defendant's initial detention was unconstitutional
because "nothing" supported "reasonable suspicion of illegal
conduct upon the part of the Defendant" (id..)*

T

^e court also

stated that "[t]here was a seizure of Defendant when he was
detained by Officer Horrocks in that Defendant was technically
under arrest since he was not free to leave" (R. 103).
The court held that "Officer Horrocks had good cause to
search the Defendant after the Defendant was stopped" (R. 103).
However, based upon its ruling that the detention was invalid at
its inception, the court ordered suppression of the evidence
seized from defendant (R. 103). The State challenges the ruling,
underpinning the trial court's ultimate order of dismissal, that
the detention of defendant by Trooper Horrocks was invalid at its
inception.
7
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court's ruling that the initial detention was
unsupported by reasonable suspicion was clearly erroneous,
because it was induced by an erroneous view of the law.

The

court erroneously overstated the degree of proof necessary to
show "reasonable suspicion" for a nonarrest detention.

That

error, apparent on the face of the trial court's ruling, equated
reasonable suspicion with the higher degree of proof required for
probable cause.
This Court should reaffirm that the degree of proof
needed for reasonable suspicion is less than that for probable
cause.

It can then remand this case to the trial court for re-

analysis under the correct, "minimal objective justification"
standard.

Alternatively, this Court may examine the established

facts independently, and hold that based upon those facts,
defendant's initial detention by Trooper Horrocks was proper.
ARGUMENT
BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY EQUATED
REASONABLE SUSPICION WITH PROBABLE CAUSE, ITS
"NO REASONABLE SUSPICION" RULING WAS CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS.
A trial court's ruling on the existence of reasonable
suspicion to make an investigatory detention is reversed on
appeal only if it is clearly erroneous.

State v. Mendoza, 748

P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987); State v. Svkes, 198 Utah Adv. Rep. 35,
36 (main opinion), 43 (Jackson, J., concurring) (Utah App. Oct.
19, 1992).

A ruling is clearly erroneous if it is "without

adequate evidentiary support or induced by an erroneous view of
8
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the law."

State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)

(quoting Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2585
(1971), with respect to factual findings).

The trial court's "no

reasonable suspicion" ruling in this case was induced by an
erroneous view of the law—a view that overstated the degree of
proof needed for reasonable suspicion*
A.

The Degree of Proof Needed for Reasonable
Suspicion is Less than that Needed for
Probable Cause,
The trial court's ruling that "[d]efendant was

technically under arrest since he was not free to leave" when
stopped (emphasis added) reveals a fundamental misperception of
the nature of defendant's initial detention by Trooper Horrocks.
This misperception appears on the face of both the trial court's
final conclusions of law and its earlier ruling denying the
State's motion to reconsider.

In that ruling, the court stated:

"No matter how you consider the facts in this case, they do not
establish reasonable cause to believe that the Defendant was
committing any crime or had committed a public offense at this
time and place that would justify his apprehension and detention"
(R. 97, emphasis added).
While defendant was not free to leave at the moment
when Horrocks stopped him, he was not "under arrest" either.
Instead, as found by the trial court, and established by
uncontested testimony, defendant was stopped in order to "secure"
him and his vehicle, pending issuance of a warrant to search his
brother's home (R. 101, 155-56, 219). Therefore, defendant's
9
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encounter with Trooper Horrocks began as a temporary detention,
not an arrest or "apprehension,"3
By mischaracterizing the initial detention as an
arrest, the trial court directed itself to the wrong provision of
the Utah Code, governing warrantless arrests, rather than
temporary detentions.

The arrest provision, Utah Code Ann. § 77-

7-2 (1990), requires probable or "reasonable cause"—the same
term used by the trial court—for full custodial arrests.

The

trial court should have analyzed the detention under the lessstrict "reasonable suspicion" standard of Utah Code Ann. § 77-715 (1990), which codifies the "investigatory detention" principle
of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968).
The trial court so erred even though the prosecutor,
during argument of the motion to suppress, directed it to State
v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646 (Utah 1989) (R. 234). In Bruce, the Utah
Supreme Court considered facts similar to this case: A robbery
witness saw the robber disappear, on foot, into a housing
complex.

Moments later, the witness saw an orange car exit the

complex, but could not see its occupants.

Police were notified,

and broadcast a description of the orange car; an officer who
overheard the broadcast saw the car, and stopped it.

Bruce, a

passenger in the car, was then identified as the robber and
arrested.

779 P.2d at 648. On appeal, the supreme court readily

3

See State v. Beckendorf, 79 Utah 360, 365-66, 10 P.2d 1073,
1075-76 (1932) (absent "actual restraint" and officer intent to
take person into custody, there is no arrest; construing statutes
now found at Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-1 (1990)).
10
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upheld the initial stop, even though the police broadcast had
added unverified information that the orange car was occupied by
two black males.

Even absent the information about the black

males, the court held, the stop was supported by reasonable
suspicion, and was therefore proper.

Ld. at 650-51.

Significantly, the defendant in Bruce had argued that
his initial detention was unsupported by probable cause.

77 9

P.2d at 650. The supreme court, however, relying upon Terry and
its own post-Terry caselaw—and, by implication, section 77-7-15,
upheld the stop on the less strict, reasonable suspicion
standard:

"We have held that a brief investigatory stop of an

individual by police officers is permissible when the officers
have a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the
individual is involved in criminal activity."

Bruce, 119 P.2d at

650 (quoting authorities; internal quotations omitted)/
Shortly before Bruce was issued, the United States
Supreme Court reiterated that the degree of proof for reasonable
suspicion is less than that required for probable cause:
The officer, of course, must be able to
articulate something more than an inchoate
and unparticularized suspicion or "hunch."
The Fourth Amendment requires "some minimal
*In its original ruling granting the motion to suppress, the
trial court cited Bruce, correctly stating that in a reasonable
suspicion-based detention, an officer "can only stop the vehicle
[or subject] briefly while attempting to obtain further information
regarding those suspicions" (R. 82). The court may have then felt
that Horrocks's stop of defendant, proper at its inception,
exceeded its legitimate scope. However, in its final findings of
fact and conclusions of law, the trial court squarely ruled that
the stop, once effected, was legitimate in scope; it ruled the stop
improper at its inception (R. 103).
11
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level of objective justification" for making
the stop* That level of suspicion is
considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by
a preponderance of the evidence. We have
held that probable cause means "a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a
crime will be found," and the level of
suspicion required for a Terry stop is
obviously less demanding than probable cause
•

• • •

United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585
(1989) (citations and some quotations omitted).

Accord Terry,

392 U.S. at 30, 88 S. Ct. at 1884.
In the wake of Sokolow, this Court also recognized that
reasonable suspicion requires less certainty than probable cause,
by stating, in State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah App.
1990), that reasonable suspicion "must be based on objective
facts suggesting that the individual may be involved in criminal
activity" (emphasis added).

This comports with the fourth

amendment's "minimal objective justification" standard for
reasonable suspicion, set forth in Sokolow.5
The Menke-Sokolow definition of reasonable suspicion
recognizes that limited, non-arrest detentions serve not merely
to apprehend criminals, but also to dispel suspicion and prevent
criminal activity.

E.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S. Ct. at

1880 (limited detentions supported by interest in "effective

5

A1though the Utah Constitution's search and seizure
provision, Article I, section 14, was mentioned in defendant's
motion to suppress and in the trial court's rulings granting the
motion (R. 75, 102), that provision was not alleged to provide
greater protection than the fourth amendment. Accordingly, this
appeal proceeds under a fourth amendment analysis. See State v.
Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1272-73 & n.5 (Utah App. 1990).
12
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crime prevention and detection"); accord Svkes, 198 Utah Adv.
Rep. at 45 n.l (Bench, P.J., dissenting).

That definition

contemplates a very real likelihood that many such detentions
will reveal no criminal evidence.

That likelihood, however, does

not erode the validity of acting upon facts that, at the moment
in question, would warrant a person of "reasonable caution" in
taking action.

Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S. Ct. at 1880.

In sum, the trial court applied the wrong legal
standard to its analysis of defendant's detention by Trooper
Horrocks.

Put differently, the court analyzed the detention

within the wrong legal "field of inquiry."

See State v.

Richardson, 843 P.2d 517, 521-23 (Utah App. 1992) (Bench, P.J.,
concurring).

By inquiring into probable cause to arrest, rather

than "minimal objective justification" to effect an investigatory
detention, the trial court committed clear error in ruling that
the detention was improper at its inception.
B.

Analyzed under the Correct "Minimal Objective
Justification" Degree of Proof, the Initial
Detention Was Supported by Reasonable Suspicion,
and Was therefore Proper.
This Court may appropriately remand this case to the

trial court, with instructions to re-analyze the propriety of
defendant's initial detention under the legally correct degree of
proof.

However, the underlying "historical facts" surrounding

this detention, c£. State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d 1296, 1300 (Utah
App. 1991), appear settled, so far as the State is concerned.
Therefore, this Court may choose to decide the detention's

13
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propriety itself, under the "minimal objective justification"
standard for reasonable suspicion.
In applying the foregoing fourth amendment standard,
the State confines its analysis to the initial detention of this
defendant.

The State notes that questions regarding the "scope"

of a detention, once properly initiated, involve a similar
analysis.

Recognizing the value of more concise briefing,

however, the State will, in arguing that defendant's detention
was supported by minimal objective justification, compare this
case only to other cases that analyze initial detentions.
The following established facts constituted the
necessary minimal objective justification for this detention:
The spontaneous statements of the intoxicated driver, Sandstrom,
prompted surveillance of Devon Potter's home, and the application
for a warrant to search that home.

During ongoing surveillance,

pending arrival of the warrant, the home's occupants repeatedly
peered outside, appearing to be concerned about the nearby police
presence.

Defendant then drove to the home, remained there only

briefly, and departed.
There may have been wholly innocent explanations, and
alternative inferences, to be gleaned from every one of the
foregoing facts.

This, however, has never been a proper basis

for ruling that an investigative detention was invalid:
We said in Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 100
S. Ct. 2752, [] (1980) (per curiam), "there
could, of course, be circumstances in which
wholly lawful conduct might justify the
suspicion that criminal activity was afoot."
. . . Indeed, Terry rv* Ohio! itself involved
14
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"a series of acts, each of them perhaps
innocent" if viewed separately, "but which
taken together warranted further
investigation." 392 U.S., at 22, 88 S. Ct.,
at 1881.
Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 9-10, 109 S. Ct. at 1586-87. Accordingly,
in Menke, this Court correctly held that the behavior of an
individual outside a shopping mall, "although conceivably
consistent with innocent—albeit highly eccentric—activity,"
were nevertheless also consistent with shoplifting.
541.

787 P.2d at

Therefore, the detention of that individual by observing

law officers was deemed reasonable.

Id.

In this case, the trial court concluded that there were
"no articulable facts" connecting defendant with possible illegal
activity inside Devon Potter's home "other than his brief
appearance on the premises" (R. 102). Certainly defendant could
not be convicted of wrongdoing based upon this fact alone;
certainly this fact alone could not support probable cause to
arrest or search him.

However, it is equally clear that under

the "minimal objective justification" standard, there was
reasonable suspicion to detain defendant.
Defendant's "brief appearance" at Devon Potter's home
cannot be viewed in isolation, as the trial court apparently did
here.

Instead, the totality of the circumstances must be

considered.

State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987).

The circumstances surrounding defendant's appearance at
the home included a chain of unusual events and "eccentric"
behavior.

The home's occupants, at least reasonably suspected of
15
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possessing illicit drugs, showed great interest in the nearby
police presence.

It was reasonable to infer that, worried about

a possible police investigation into their activities, the home's
occupants might summon a friend to remove any incriminating
evidence from the premises.6

Defendant's brief visit, even

though consistent with innocent behavior, was also consistent
with this inference.

There was, therefore, a minimal objective

justification, and therefore reasonable suspicion, to allow
Trooper Horrocks to detain defendant.
To be sure, there are cases wherein Utah appellate
courts have condemned investigatory detentions based upon the
detainees' mere presence near a crime scene, or mere proximity to
other persons suspected of criminal behavior.

See, e.g., State

v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) (driving slowly
through neighborhood that had experienced a "rash of burglaries"
did not justify detention); State v. Swaniaan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah
1985) (per curiam) (walking in neighborhood of home burglarized
several hours earlier did not justify detention); State v. Svkes,
198 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (Utah App. Oct. 19, 1992) (defendant who
left premises under general surveillance for suspected drug
6

In the trial court, the State made oral argument and filed a
memorandum, arguing along the lines set forth in this brief (R. 9295, 234-36, 254-57).
The State specifically referred to "the
lesser burden of establishing reasonable suspicion" (R. 94-95).
The concealment of criminal evidence constitutes one form of
the offense of obstructing justice, Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-306
(Supp. 1992), and may also constitute tampering with evidence, Utah
Code Ann. § 76-8-510 (1990). While not articulated by the State in
the trial court, such loss of evidence was clearly a concern
underlying this detention, and brought this detention within
section 77-7-15's required suspicion of a "public offense."
16
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activity was improperly detained); State v. Munsen, 821 P.2d 13
(Utah App. 1991) (woman was improperly detained as she approached
a truck wherein suspicious behavior was observed), cert, denied,
843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992); State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213 (Utah
App, 1991) (defendant was improperly detained while apparently
approaching, but before reaching, premises that were being
searched pursuant to warrant); State v. Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85
(Utah App. 1987) (defendant walking in area of recent "car
prowls" was improperly detained; unclear whether detention began
with initial encounter or when officer actually frisked
defendant).

Of those cases issued after the United States

Supreme Court's Sokolow decision, however, not one cites the
correct "minimal objective justification" standard for reasonable
suspicion-based detentions.
Of the foregoing cases, the facts in Steward and Svkes
most closely resemble the facts in this case. Although neither
case cited the minimal objective justification standard, both
appear to have been correctly decided under it.

Both cases, like

this one, involved stops of individuals near "suspect premises."
Nevertheless, each is distinctive from this case in a key
circumstance:

In Steward, the defendant was stopped before even

reaching the premises, which were then being searched pursuant to
a warrant.

The Court aptly observed that when the officers first

effected the detention, they could not distinguish the defendant
from any innocent person who might have been driving past on the
public street.

806 P.2d at 216.

In Svkes, no warrant had yet
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been sought for the suspect premises; only preliminary
surveillance was under way.

Still lacking "positive evidence

linking the house to illegal activity," an officer stopped
defendant Sykes after she briefly visited it.
held, was improper.

This, the Court

198 Utah Adv. Rep. at 37-38.

Here, in contrast, defendant actually made contact with
the occupants of Devon Potter's home, remaining there a short
time—but long enough to retrieve the "bag of marijuana" said, by
Sandstrom, to be present therein.

Further, the home was no

longer under preliminary surveillance.

Instead, as a result of

Sandstrom's report and other evidence tending to show probable
cause, a search warrant application was then in progress.

The

surveilling officers had a legitimate interest in preventing the
evidence that they hoped to find in the home from being spirited
away before the warrant arrived.

Defendant's appearance at the

home, as they awaited the warrant, created minimally objective
justification, or reasonable suspicion, to act against such an
untoward possibility.
Once again, it was the possibility of evidence loss,
not the certainty, and the objective facts tending to heighten
that possibility, that justified this detention.

The detention

may have proven that the possibility had not been realized.

In

fact, this case can be approached as though it turned out that
Officer Horrocks had stopped an entirely innocent individual—
perhaps a door-to-door salesperson, or somebody merely stopping
to ask directions.

This, however, would not undercut the
18
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validity of the detention, under the correct "minimal objective
justification" standard for reasonable suspicion.
The trial court's condemnation of this detention is
also troubling from a policy perspective.
of unbridled, arbitrary police action.

This was no instance

Rather, the involved

officers acted with appropriate restraint, watching Devon
Potter's home while awaiting a warrant, rather than immediately
barging in on the strength of Sandstrom's allegations alone.
When they became concerned that the brief visit to the home by
the white Nissan represented a threat to their wish to perform a
successful search, they did not immediately pounce on the
vehicle.

Rather, they consulted with one another—and apparently

with the county attorney as well, before deciding to detain it.
Simply put, this is not the kind of police behavior that should
be deterred through the harsh remedy of suppression.

Instead,

such self-restrained behavior should be upheld.
CONCLUSION
The trial court applied an incorrect legal standard in
ruling that the detention of defendant was, at its outset,
unsupported by reasonable suspicion.

Accordingly, that ruling

was clearly erroneous, and this Court should reverse it. This
Court may then either remand this case, instructing the trial
court to re-analyze the detention under the correct standard, or
apply that standard itself and hold that the initial detention
was proper.

19
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 0>°
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL D«TR:CT COURT
OFl/T^"-1

-• •••

•-•••OTY

APR 1 3 1992
Deputy

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

jI
)

RULING ON MOTION TO
SUPPRESS

i

Criminal No. 1029

Plaintiff,

vs.
WAYNE DERRON POTTER,
Defendant.

The Defendant's Motion to Suppress the evidence in
this case came on for hearing before the Court on April 6,
1992.

The

testimony
stipulation

attorneys
of
of

Trooper
the

were

present

Jeff

parties,

and

Horrocks
considered

the

Court

and,
the

heard

purusant

to

testimony

of

Officers of the Emery County Sheriff's Department by way of a
transcript of hearing held on September 16, 1991, on a motion
to suppress in the case of State v Devon Boyd Potter where
the

incidents

leading

up to the stop of the

Defendant's

vehicle were covered.
The Court finds that Officer Horrocks had good cause
to search the Defendant after he stopped him in his vehicle.
Although the officer did not know who was driving the vehicle
until

he

approached

it,

he

immediately

recognized

the

defendant at that time and, by prior experience and general
reputation, he knew that there may be some danger to himself
if he carried out his intent to detain the Defendant without
conducting a search for weapons.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The Officer stopped the vehicle with the intent to
detain the occupants.

Once this was done, the occupants were

technically under arrest since they were not free to leave,
and the officer has the right, under these circumstances, to
search
firearm

for weapons, which he did.
concealed

on the person

In

fact, he

of the Defendant

found a
in the

search.
The question the Court must consider, however, is
the legality of the stop of the vehicle and the detention of
the Defendant.

If this was done in violation of Defendant's

constitutional rights, it follows that the evidence recovered
from the search incident to that detention cannot be used as
evidence.
There

are

several

recent

cases

that

have

been

considered by the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in
Utah that analyze this question.
"Thus,

'a stop can be justified

They all conclude that
only upon

a showing

of

reasonable suspicion that defendant was committing a crime,
or that he was stopped

incident to a traffic offense'11.

(State v. Roth, 181 UAR 25)

2
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In

order

to

satisfy

the

reasonable

suspicion

inquiry, it must be determined if, from the facts apparent to
Officer Horrocks, and the reasonable inference drawn therefrom, that he would reasonably suspect that the Defendant was
committing,

or had committed,

a crime prior to the stop.

This suspicion must be based upon articulated objective facts
then apparent to the officer.
Officer

Horrocks

had

a

right

to

rely

on

the

information given to him by other officers as a basis to
support his reasonable suspicion, but only if the basis for
the matters relayed were also based upon articulated facts*
Officer Horrocks was told by Deputy Mangum that the trailer
home that they were observing from about one-half block away
was

under

secured.

surveilance

while

a

search

warrant

was

being

He further informed him that an informant, who had

just previously been arrested for drunk driving, had told the
officers that there was a pot party going on in the trailer
and that marijuana was present.
Horrocks
trailer

further

stated

that while

observing

the

he saw a person get out a car near the trailer, go

to the trailer, and then go to the car, get into the car and
begin

to

drive

away.

At

that

point,

Officer

Mangum

instructed Officer Horrocks to stop the car and to detain the
occupants pending the arrival of the search warrant.
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Officer

Horrocks

followed

these

instructions

and

stopped the vehicle with the intent to detain its occupants
pending the arrival of the search warrant, or pending further
instructions.

Without any other facts that would indicate

any illegal activity on the part of the occupants of the car,
the vehicle was stopped.
The Defendant was not in the house trailer when the
officers

entered

it

to

secure

the

premises

pending

the

receipt of a search warrant, and he was not identified to
them

by the

imformant

as being

in the trailer when the

informant said he observed marijuana or that a pot party was
in progress.
If

there

was

reasonable

cause

to

believe

that

illegal activity was going on inside the trailer at that time,
there were no articulatable facts connecting the Defendant
with such activity other than his brief appearance on the
premises.

None of the officers knew who the occupants of the

vehicle were until it was stopped by Officer Horrocks.

Since

they did not know that the Defendant personally was in the
vehicle or that he personally was on the premises, the fact
that they may have known that he was a convicted drug abuser
is

immaterial

since

this

fact

was

not

used

informulating reasonable suspicion.
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by

them

The attorney

for the State in articulating

facts

states that Deputy Gayle Jensen personally observed defendant
enter and exit the trailer.

On review of Deputy Jensen's

testimony (Transcript, page 32), he did not state that he saw
the defendant enter and leave but only that he saw a little
white car leave the trailer.
There was nothing in what Officer Horrocks knew or
in what was conveyed to him that would

create reasonable

suspicion of illegal conduct upon the part of the Defendant.
There was nothing at the time that any of the deputies of the
Emery County Sheriff's Office could facutally articulate that
would give rise to reasonable suspicion that the Defendant
had

committed

or

was

committing

a

crime

except

his

unidentified brief appearance on the premises as indicated.
The Courts have consistently

held

that this fact

alone is not enough to create reasonable suspicion.
Even

in

cases

where

the

officer

has

reasonable

suspicion of illegal activity based upon direction from a
dispatch officer or from other police officers, and he stops
a

vehicle,

attempting
suspicions.

he
to

can
obtain

only

stop

further

the

vehicle

information

briefly

while

regarding

those

(See State v Bruce. 779 P2d 646)
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Office Horrocks stated that he stopped the vehicle
to detain the occupants pending further instructions or, the
Court assumes, until the arrival of the search warrant for
the trailer, and that his purpose was not to investigate or
to make further inquiry relative to any suspicions of illegal
activity.
For

these

reasons,

THE

COURT

FINDS

that

the

Defendant's constitutional rights were violated, and that the
stop was not legally made, and that the Motion for Summary
Judgment is granted.
The Attorney for the Defendant is directed to make
formal Findings of Fact and an Order granting the Motion to
Suppress.

.,

DATED this

~Z ^> day of April, 1992.

/
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing

RULING ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS

depositing the same in the United States Mail, postage
prepaid, to the following:
Mark T. Ethington
DAY AND BARNEY
Attorneys at Law
45 East Vine Street
Murray UT
84107
Patricia Geary
Emery County Attorney
Post Office Box 1099
Castle Dale UT
84513
DATED this

Q ^

day of April, 1992.

Secretary
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH1/

RULING ON MOTION TO
RECONSIDER

)

Plaintiff,

)

V.

WAYNE DERRON POTTER,

)

Defendant.
The State has
reconsider

its previous

Criminal No, 91-2660

)

filed

a motion

ruling

relative

asking the Court to
to

the

Defendant's

Motion to Suppress the Evidence gathered against him.
In view of the fact that the Court missed the statement by Deputy Jensen found on page 37 of the transcript of his
testimony, THE COURT WILL grant the Motion and will reconsider
its previous ruling.
The statement of the Deputy contained at that page
still leaves some doubt as to whether or not he recognized the
Defendant at the time the Defendant left the trailer since his
statement about seeing him leave came after he had talked to
Officer Horrocks and the Defendant had been identified to him
as the driver of the white car.

No one whose testimony was

used for the purpose of this hearing mentions the name of the
Defendant at anytime prior to the stop and his identification
being made known by Officer Horrocks.
Recorded in Judgment Record
U
at Page 5 ^
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The instructions to Officer Horrocks were to stop the white car
and no mention was made relative to its occupants.
However, for the sake of this ruling we will assume
that the Deputy recognized the Defendant as the person who left
the trailer ?.nd drove away in the white car.
The i

still remains that the Defendant was not in

the trailer at the time the Officers entered, and he was not
mentioned by the informant as being present at the alleged pot
party.
On the contrary, Officer Horrocks said he observed the
driver of the white car get out of the car, go to the trailer
and return to the car and drive away.
No matter how you consider the facts in this case,
they do not establish reasonable cause to believe that the
Defendant was committing any crime or had committed a public
offense

at

this

time

and

place

that

would

justify

his

apprehension and detention.
FOR THESE REASONS, the Court affirms its prior ruling
that the Motion to Suppress be granted.
DATED this ^sSj^day of April, 1992.

0013mw
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing

RULING ON MOTION TO RECONSIDER

depositing the same in the United States Mail, postage
prepaid, to the following:
Mark T. Ethington
Attorney at Law
DAY AND BARNEY
45 East Vine Street
Murray, UT
84107
Patricia Geary
EMERY COUNTY ATTORNEY
P. 0. BOX 249
Castle Dale UT
84013
DATED this ^ f / f L d a y of April, 1992
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
]l
>
]

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
i

WAYNE DERRON POTTER,
Defendant.

Case No. 1029

]

The Defendant's Motion to Suppress, previously filed in
this case, came on for hearing before the Court on April 6, 1992.
After

hearing

pursuant

to

the

testimony

stipulation

of

of
the

Tropper

Jeff

parties,

Horrocks

and

considering

the

testimony of various officers of Emery County as set forth in a
transcript of a suppression hearing in the case of State v.
Devon Boyd Potter where the incidents leading up to the stop of
Defendant's vehicle are set forth, the Court now makes the
following findings of fact and conclusions of law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Officer Horrocks was told by Deputy Mangum that the

trailer home that they were observing from about one-half block
away was under suerveillance while a search warrant was being
secured.

9p

Recorded in Judgment Record
_
A _ aBYU.
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2.

Deputy Mangum

further

informed

Officer Horrocks

that an informant, who had previously been arrested for drunk
driving, had told the officers that there was a pot party going
on in the trailer and that marijuana was present.
3.

While observing the trailer, Officer Horrocks saw a

person get out of a car near the trailer, go to the trailer and
then come back to the car a short while later, get into the car
and begin to drive away.
4.

Officer Gayle Jensen (the officer who stopped the

DUI suspect) observed the same vehicle leave the trailer.
5.

The Defendant

(who was subsequently discovered to

be the driver of the vehicle) was not in the house trailer when
the officers

subsequently

entered

it to secure the premises

pending receipt of a search warrant.
6.

The Defendant was not identified by the informant

as being in the trailer when the informant said he observed
marijuana or that a pot party was in progress.
7.

Deputy

Jensen,

who

was

on

the

premises

being

secured, recognized the Defendant as the person who was driving
away in the car and knew that the Defendant had been previously
convicted of a drug offense.

-2-
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8.

As the vehicle was leaving the trailer, Deputy

Mangum, upon instruction from Deputy Jensen, requested Officer
Horrocks to stop the vehicle and to detain the occupants pending
arrival of the search warrant.
9.

Without any other facts that would

indicate any

illegal activity on the part of any of the occupants of the car,
Officer Horrocks then stopped the vehicle with the intent to
detain the occupants until either the search warrant arrived or
until further instructions.

Officer Horrocks' purpose was not

to

further

investigate

or

to make

inquiry

relative

to any

suspicions or illegal activity.

driving

10.

Although Officer Horrocks did not know who was

the

vehicle

before

the

stop,

upon

approaching

the

vehicle he immediately recognized the Defendant as the driver of
the vehicle, and, by prior experience and reputation, he knew
that there may be some danger to himself if he carried out his
intent to detain the Defendant without a search for weapons.
11.

Officer Horrocks then conducted a search of the

occupants, including the Defendant, by having them empty their
pockets.

A concealed firearm was discovered on the person of

the Defendant during the course of this search.

101
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Officer Horrocks then arrested the Defendant for

carrying a concealed weapon, and then searched the Defendant
incident to this arrest, and during this search he discovered
some marijuana and some pills and a small container containing
what was later analyzed as cocaine residue.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

If there was

reasonable

cause

to believe

that

illegal activity was going on inside the trailer, there was no
articulable facts connecting the Defendant with such activity
other than his brief appearance on the premises.
2.
in

what

There was nothing in what Officer Horrocks knew or

was

conveyed

to

him

that

would

create

reasonable

suspicion of illegal conduct upon the part of the Defendant.
There was nothing at the time that any of the deputies of the
Emery County Sheriff's Office could factually articulate that
would give rise to reasonable suspicion that the Defendant had
committed or was committing a crime except his brief appearance
on the premises.
3.
Defendant's

Because there was no reasonable suspicion to stop
vehicle

for

the

purpose

of

detaining

him,

the

Defendant's constitutional rights as set forth in the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United
Aarticle

I Section

14

of the Utah

States Constitution, and
Constitution

prohibiting

unreasonable searches and seizures was violated, and Defendant's
Motion to Suppress should be granted.
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4.

There was

a

seizure

of

Defendant

when

he was

detained by Officer Horrocks in that Defendant was technically
under arrest since he was not free to leave.
5.

Officer Horrocks had

good

cause

Defendant after the Defendant was stopped.

to

search

the

However, evidence

discovered as a result of the search should be suppressed as a
result of the prior illegal stop.
DATED this

/

day of May, 1992.

SO^BUpfeLL, Di'&tHct Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing
LAW

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF

by depositing the same in the United States Mail,

postage prepaid, to the following:
Mark T. Ethington
DAY AND BARNEY
Attorneys at Law
45 East Vine Street
Murray UT
84107
Patricia Geary
Emery County Attorney
Post Office Box 1099
Castle Dale UT
84513
DATED this f **

day of May, 1992
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDiCAL DSTR'CT COURT
OF UTA^ iN Avn rr\ A'rqv noij^y

MAY
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Mark T. Ethington (4828)
DAY & BARNEY
Attorneys for Defendant
45 E. Vine Street
Murray, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801)262-6800
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L

^./L^

Deputy

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ORDER ON MOTION TO
SUPPRESS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
WAYNE DERRON POTTER,

Case No. 1029
Judge Boyd Bunnell

Defendant.

The Defendant's Motion to Suppress, previously filed in this
case, came on for hearing before the Court on April 6, 1992. After
hearing the testimony of Trooper Jeff Horrocks and, pursuant to
stipulation of the parties, considering the testimony of various
officers of Emery County as set forth in a transcript of a
suppression hearing in the case of State v. Devon Boyd Potter where
the incidents leading up to the stop of Defendant's vehicle are set
forth, and pursuant to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
entered herewith, it is hereby,
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that Defendant's Motion to
Suppress is granted, and any and all evidence seized from the
Defendant as a result of the stop and subsequent search in question,
including but not limited to, a Titan 25 Caliber semi automatic
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pistol serial number D823944, small plastic tuperware container
allegedly containing cocaine residue, any alleged cocaine residue,
marijuana, twelve Tylenol 3 tablets, and various other pills, shall
be suppressed and not be allowed to be used as evidence against the
Defendant.
Dated this

/

day of

/^7-lB^f

. 1992.

<£2ZJ-

Judcje Boyd Bunn
^

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Patricia Geary
Emery County Attorney
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DKTP.1CT COURT
OF UTAH !N AMD POR EM^PY COUNTY

JUN 191992
bnuUfcC. FUNK-Clerk
By

. ^ ^

Deputy

Mark T. Ethington (4828)
DAY & BARNEY
Attorneys for Defendant
45 E. Vine Street
Murray, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801)262-6800
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff,

:

vs.

MOTION TO DISMISS

:

WAYNE D. POTTER,

:

Defendant.

Case No. 1029
Judge Boyd Bunnell

:

COMES NOW the Defendant, by and through his attorney, and hereby
respectfully moves this Court to dismiss with prejudice the
Information herein for the following reasons.

On April 6, 1992, a

hearing was held before this Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress
all of the evidence seized from the Defendant at the time of his
arrest in this matter.
at that time.

This Court took the matter under advisement

On April 9, 1992, this Court entered a written Ruling

on Motion to Suppress wherein Defendant's motion was granted.

On

April 21, 1992, the State of Utah filed a Motion to Reconsider or for
Rehearing.

On April 28, 1992, this Court entered a written Ruling on

Motion to Reconsider wherein the State's motion was denied.

On May

7, 1992, this Court entered an Order on Motion to Suppress along with
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law wherein the Defendant's
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Motion to Suppress was granted.

A mailing certificate was attached

to the Order indicating that a copy of the Order had been delivered
to Patricia Geary, Emery County Attorney,
At least thirty (30) days have now elapsed since the filing of
the Court's Order granting the motion to suppress, and the State has
not filed an interlocutory appeal.
Because the State essentially can not make a prima facie case
against the Defendant due to the granting of the motion to suppress,
it would be fruitless and a waste of time and resources to proceed
with a trial of this matter.

Furthermore, it is unreasonable to

continue to let the charges just sit without some type of action on
them.

This may constitute a violation of Defendant's Sixth Amendment

right to a speedy trial.
Consequently, the Defendant respectfully requests that the
Information herein be dismissed with prejudice.
Dated this

day of June, 1992.
Mark T. Ethingto
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that I am employed by the office of Day & Barney and
that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to
Dismiss, postage pre-paid, to the following:
Patricia Geary
Emery County Attorney
P.O. Box 249
Castle Dale, Utah 84513-0249
on this In day of June, 1992.
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By
.. Deputy

MARK T. ETHINGTON (4828)
DAY & BARNEY
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT
45 EAST VINE STREET
MURRAY, UTAH 84107
TELEPHONE: (801) 262-6800

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION
vs.
WAYNE D. POTTER,
Civil No. 1029
Judge Boyd Bunnell

Defendant.

Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss filed with the Court on the 18th
day of June, 1992, by Mark T. Ethington, Attorney for Defendant, is
now at issue and ready for decision of the Court.
DATED and SIGNED this JZ.

&a

Y

of

August, 1992.

7k*U T?jLpt

Mark
Mark T. Ething^n
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I am employed by the office of Day & Barney, and
that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice to
Submit for Decision, postage pre-paid, to:
Patricia Geary
Emery County Attorney
P.O. Box 249
Castle Dale, Utah 84513-0249
on this fO day of August, 1992.

Cmvruju C/QA/soxm
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SEP _ 21992
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By
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
i
i

STATE OF UTAH,

RULING ON MOTION
TO DISMISS

Plaintiff,
VS.

WAYNE D. POTTER,
Defendant.

]

Criminal No. 1029

The Defendant has filed a motion to dismiss this action
on the ground that the Court granted a motion to suppress the
evidence in this case on May 7, 1992, and that the State has not
proceeded to obtain a trial date, and on the further ground that
the State has indicated that they have no other evidence of
criminal activity on the part of the Defendant as alleged in the
Information in this case.
The Plaintiff has filed no objection to the Motion•
THE COURT HEREBY GRANTS the Motion and Orders that this
case be dismissed,

/ST
DATED this

/ *

day of September, 1992.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true copy of the above
entitled RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS by depositing the same in
the United States Mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
Mark T. Ethington
DAY AND BARNEY
Attorneys at Law
45 East Vine Street
Murray UT
84107
Patricia Geary
County Attorney for Emery County
Post Office Box 249
Castle Dale UT
84513
Dated this

/sc/^

day of September, 1992•

Secretary
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R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312)
Attorney General
J. KEVIN MURPHY (5768)
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1021
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiff/Appellant,

Criminal No. 1029

v.
WAYNE D. POTTER,

Judge Boyd Bunnell

Defendant/Appellee.
The State of Utah appeals the trial court's final order
of dismissal in the above-entitled case, entered September 1, 1992.
This appeal is to the Utah Court of Appeals, and is filed pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. SS 77-18a-l(2)(a) and 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992).
DATED this

'{p

day of September, 1992j_

[iLj
J. KfiVIN MURPHY
Assistant Attorney General

PATRICIA GEARY
O \ J ^
Emery County Attorney
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing Notice of Appeal was mailed, postage prepaid, to
Mark T. Ethington, attorney for defendant/appellee, 45 East Vine
Street, Murray, Utah 84107, this

day of September, 1992.
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